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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
DAVID SHANE McBRIDE, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 960324-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 1996). 
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
[Criminal actions - Provisions concerning - Due process 
of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a 
capital, or other infamous crime, unless on a presentment 
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in 
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall 
any person be subject for the same offense to be twice 
put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled 
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor 
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation. 
The fourteenth amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides: 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law -- Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of las; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of laws. 
Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-707 (1993) (repealed effective May 
1, 1995) provided: 
41-la-707. Transfer complete upon division's issuing 
new certificate of registration and title. 
Until the division has issued a new certificate 
of registration and certificate of title, delivery of any 
vehicle required to be registered is not made and title 
has not passed, and the intended transfer is incomplete 
and not valid or effective for any purpose except as 
provided in Section 41-la-708 [limiting liability of 
former owner for damages caused by negligent operation of 
the vehicle after transfer]. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (Supp. 1996) provides: 
63-30-10. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by 
negligent act or omission of employee--Exceptions 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities 
is waived for injury proximately caused by a negligent 
act or omission of an employee committed within the scope 
of employment except if the injury arises out of, in 
connection with, or results from: 
(1) the exercise or performance or the failure 
to exercise or perform a discretionary function, 
whether or not the discretion is abused; 
(2) assault, battery, false imprisonment, 
false arrest, malicious prosecution, intentional 
trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander, deceit, 
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interference with contract rights, infliction of 
mental anguish, or violation of civil rights; 
(3) the issuance, denial, suspension, or 
revocation of or by the failure or refusal to 
issue, deny, suspend, or revoke any permit, 
license, certificate, approval, order, or similar 
authorization; 
(4) a failure to make an inspection or by 
making an inadequate or negligent inspection; 
(5) the institution or prosecution of any 
judicial or administrative proceeding, even if 
malicious or without probable cause; 
(6) a misrepresentation by an employee whether 
or not it is negligent or intentional; 
(7) riots, unlawful assemblies, public 
demonstrations, mob violence, and civil 
disturbances; 
(8) the collection of and assessment of taxes; 
(9) the activities of the Utah National Guard; 
(10) the incarceration of any person in any 
state prison, county or city jail, or other place 
of legal confinement; 
(11) any natural condition on publicly owned 
or controlled lands, any condition existing in 
connection with an abandoned mine or mining 
operation, or any activity authorized by the School 
and Institutional Trust Lands Administration or the 
Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands; 
(12) research or implementation of cloud 
management or seeding for the clearing of fog; 
(13) the management of flood waters, 
earthquakes, or natural disasters; 
(14) the construction, repair, or operation of 
flood or storm systems; 
(15) the operation of an emergency vehicle, 
while being driven in accordance with the 
requirements of Section 41-6-14; 
(16) a latent dangerous or latent defective 
condition of any highway, road, street, alley, 
crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, 
viaduct, or other structure located on them; 
(17) a latent dangerous or latent defective 
condition of any public building, structure, dam, 
reservoir, or other public improvement; 
(18) the activities of: 
(a) providing emergency medical 
assistance; 
(b) fighting fire; 
(c) regulating, mitigating, or handling 
hazardous materials or hazardous wastes; 
(d) emergency evacuations; or 
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(e) intervening during dam emergencies; 
or 
(19) the exercise or performance or the 
failure to exercise or perform any function 
pursuant to Title 73, Chapter 5a or Title 73, 
Chapter 10 which immunity is in addition to all 
other immunities granted by law. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (Supp. 1996) provides: 
-3-201. Sentences or combination of sentences allowed 
-- Civil penalties -- Restitution -- Hearing --
Definitions -- Resentencing -- Aggravation or 
mitigation of crimes with mandatory sentences. 
) As used in this section: 
(a) "Conviction" includes a: 
(i) judgment of guilt; and 
(ii) plea of guilty. 
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of 
which the defendant is convicted or any other criminal 
conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility 
to the sentencing court with or without an admission 
of committing the criminal conduct. 
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special 
damages, but not general damages, which a person could 
recover against the defendant in a civil action 
arising out of the facts or events constituting the 
defendant's criminal activities and includes the money 
equivalent of property taken, destroyed, broken, or 
otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings and 
medical expenses. 
(d) "JResti tut ion" means full, partial, or nominal 
payment for pecuniary damages to a victim, including 
the accrual of interest from the time of sentencing, 
insured damages, and payment for expenses to a 
governmental entity for extradition or transportation 
and as further defined in Subsection (4)(c). 
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person whom the court 
determines has suffered pecuniary damages as a 
result of the defendant's criminal activities. 
(ii) "Victim" does not include any 
coparticipant in the defendant's criminal 
activities. 
) (a) (i) When a person is convicted of criminal 
activity that has resulted in pecuniary 
damages, in addition to any other sentence it 
may impose, the court shall order that the 
defendant make restitution to victims of crime 
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as provided in this subsection, or for conduct 
for which the defendant has agreed to make 
restitution as part of a plea agreement. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-38 (Supp. 1996) provides: 
78-27-38. Comparative negligence 
(1) The fault of a person seeking recovery shall not 
alone bar recovery by that person. 
(2) A person seeking recovery may recover from any 
defendant or group of defendants whose fault, combined 
with the fault of persons immune from suit, exceeds the 
fault of the person seeking recovery prior to any 
reallocation of fault made under Subsection 78-27-39(2). 
(3) No defendant is liable to any person seeking 
recovery for any amount in excess of the proportion of 
fault attributed to that defendant under Section 
78-27-39. 
(4) (a) In determining the proportionate fault 
attributable to each defendant, the fact finder 
may, and when requested by a party shall, consider 
the conduct of any person who contributed to the 
alleged injury regardless of whether the person is 
a person immune from suit or a defendant in the 
action and may allocate fault to each person 
seeking recovery, to each defendant, and to any 
person immune from suit who contributed to the 
alleged injury. 
(b) Any fault allocated to a person immune 
from suit is considered only to accurately 
determine the fault of the person seeking recovery 
and a defendant and may not subject the person 
immune from suit to any liability, based on the 
allocation of fault, in this or any other action. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-40 (Supp. 1996) provides: 
78-27-40. Amount of liability limited to proportion of 
fault--No contribution 
(1) Subject to Section 78-27-38, the maximum amount 
for which a defendant may be liable to any person seeking 
recovery is that percentage or proportion of the damages 
equivalent to the percentage or proportion of fault 
attributed to that defendant. 
(2) A defendant is not entitled to contribution from 
any other person. 
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(3) A defendant or person seeking recovery may not 
bring a civil action against any person immune from suit 
to recover damages resulting from the allocation of fault 
under Section 78-27-38. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the loss of the auto at impound sale as a 
result of the failure of the police to notify the owners is 
attributable to Mr. McBride's criminal conduct, and thus a proper 
subject of criminal restitution? 
Standard of review. 
We will not disturb a trial court's order of restitution 
unless the "trial court exceeds the authority prescribed 
by law or abuses its discretion." State v. Twitchell, 
832 P.2d 866, 868 (Utah App.1992) (citations omitted); 
accord State v. Snyder, 747 P.2d 417, 422 (Utah 1987) . 
State v. Robinson, 860 P.2d 979, 980-1 (Utah App. 1993), cert. 
denied, 878 P. 2d 1154 (Utah 1994) . The question of whether the 
loss of the automobile (due to the intervening negligence of the 
police) is a proper subject for criminal restitution is a legal 
conclusion reviewed for correctness. Preserved below by 
restitution hearing generally, and more specifically at R. 66-7. 
2. Whether the evidence admitted at the restitution 
hearing is sufficiently reliable to satisfy due process? 
Standard of review. Questions of constitutional law are 
reviewed for correctness. State v. Martinez, 896 P.2d 38, 39-40 
(Utah App. 1995). See also State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781-2 
(Utah 1991) (whether admission of evidence comports with due 
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process is question of law; underlying facts are reviewed for clear 
error). Preserved below at R. 59. 
3. Whether the evidence adduced at the restitution 
hearing is sufficient to sustain imposition of the $600 restitution 
order? 
Standard of review. The standard of review for the 
sufficiency of evidence to support a restitution order is analogous 
to that for sufficiency of evidence at trial. A jury verdict is 
reviewed viewing "the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict." State v. 
Seale, 853 P.2d 862, 865 (Utah), cert, denied, 114 S.Ct. 186, 126 
L.Ed.2d 145 (1993). It is appellant's burden to marshal the 
evidence supporting the verdict. State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 
819 (Utah App. 1994); State v. Pilling, 875 P.2d 604, 607-8 (Utah 
App. 1994) . A jury verdict is reversed only if "'the evidence . . 
is [so] sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted.'" State 
v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 332 (Utah 1991) (quoting State v. Petree, 
659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)). Accord State v. Barlow, 851 P.2d 
1191, 1193 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 859 P.2d 585 (Utah 1993). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Appellant David Shane McBride, a/k/a Michael Scott 
McBride (e.g. R. 11, 12) , was charged by information with receiving 
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or transferring a stolen motor vehicle on or about April 15, 1995, 
a second degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. §41-la-
1316(2) (1993) . R. 1-2. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. McBride 
pled guilty before Judge Robert K. Hilder to unlawful control over 
a motor vehicle (joyriding) , a class A misdemeanor, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. §41-la-1311 (1993). R. 10 (two sided). 
A restitution hearing was held before Judge Anne M. 
Stirba on February 1, 1996. R. 44-73 (transcript). The trial court 
ruled in favor of the State, and requested the prosecutor to 
prepare findings and an order. R. 71. On March 11, 1996, the 
trial court entered its order of restitution of $600 payable to Mr. 
Toby Martinez. R. 22-25 (counsel drafted findings). Judge Stirba 
granted a stipulated motion to extend time for filing a notice of 
appeal, R. 42-3, and appellant appealed within the time so 
extended. R. 31-2. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
After Mr. McBride was apprehended, the police impounded 
the car. The police copied the Vehicle Identification Number 
("VIN") down incorrectly, and the purported owner, Wade Maneotis, 
and purported security interest holder, Toby Martinez, were not 
notified of the impound. The vehicle was sold at auction. These 
facts were entered by stipulation: 
Your honor, at this time I would like to submit 
-- I believe we can do it by stipulation --a little bit 
of what occurred about the car . . . and that is after it 
was stolen it was recovered by one of the police agencies 
. . . . They impounded. It was sent to the . . . state 
tax impound yard. Somebody miswrote the serial number; 
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therefore, it was not tracked properly. Neither Mr. 
Maneotis, nor Toby Martinez . . . were contacted. The 
car sat there accumulating storage and -- and towing 
bills and then it was eventually sold to someone on 
auction, and that car is no longer available to either 
the State or -- or Toby Martinez. 
R. 61. The record is silent as to the proceeds of that sale or how 
such proceeds were distributed. 
The State requested $600 restitution to Toby Martinez, 
the purported security interest holder. R. 48. The only witness 
who testified at the restitution hearing was Ellen Hunter, the 
live-in girlfriend of Toby Martinez. R. 45, 50. Defense counsel 
objected to her testimony on hearsay and due process reliability 
grounds. R. 52, 57-9. 
Ms. Hunter testified that Mr, Martinez sold the vehicle 
to Wade Maneotis for $800, $200 cash down payment and $600 to be 
paid at a later date. Mr. Martinez retained the car's title to 
secure the purchase price. R. 51-54, ex. 1 (bill of sale, attached 
as addendum B) . 
Judge Stirba ordered $600 restitution payable to Mr. 
Martinez. R. 71. The trial court entered detailed findings, R. 
22-5, prepared by the prosecution, which included conclusion of law 
number 3: 
3. The actions of the police in misreading 
the identification number of the car and the resulting 
sale of the car did not eliminate or limit defendant's 
responsibility to pay restitution for the loss caused by 
his actions. 
The findings and conclusions are attached as addendum A. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
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Utah's restitution statute provides that a crime victim 
may recover "all special damages, but not general damages, which a 
person could recover against the defendant in a civil action 
arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's 
criminal activities." Here, the loss of the automobile was 
proximately caused by the negligence of the police in failing to 
notify the owner prior to impound sale. Because this superseding 
negligence was not foreseeable, Mr. McBride is not liable through 
restitution for the damages sustained as a result of this 
intervening and superseding negligence. 
As a matter of due process, the evidence adduced at the 
restitution hearing was insufficiently reliable to support the 
restitution order imposed. Neither party to the purported vehicle 
sale testified, and the State relied entirely on hearsay evidence. 
The sole testifying witness, girlfriend of the purported security 
interest holder, testified that it was possible that her boyfriend 
had been paid for the car without her knowledge. The restitution 
order should not have been entered. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. MR. McBRIDE IS NOT RESPONSIBLE IN 
RESTITUTION FOR LOSSES RESULTING SOLELY FROM 
THE INTERVENING AND SUPERSEDING NEGLIGENCE OF 
THE POLICE IN HAVING THE CAR SOLD AT AUCTION 
WITHOUT NOTIFYING THE OWNERS. 
This appeal presents the question of what damages may 
properly be the subject of a criminal restitution order. Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-201 (Supp. 1996) provides in pertinent part: 
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76-3-201• Sentences or combination of sentences allowed 
-- Civil penalties -- Restitution -- Hearing --
Definitions -- Resentencing -- Aggravation or 
mitigation of crimes with mandatory sentences, 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Conviction" includes a: 
(i) judgment of guilt; and 
(ii) plea of guilty. 
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of 
which the defendant is convicted or any other criminal 
conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility 
to the sentencing court with or without an admission 
of committing the criminal conduct. 
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special 
damages, but not general damages, which a person could 
recover against the defendant in a civil action 
arising out of the facts or events constituting the 
defendant's criminal activities and includes the money 
equivalent of property taken, destroyed, broken, or 
otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings and 
medical expenses. 
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal 
payment for pecuniary damages to a victim, including 
the accrual of interest from the time of sentencing, 
insured damages, and payment for expenses to a 
governmental entity for extradition or transportation 
and as further defined in Subsection (4)(c). 
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person whom the court 
determines has suffered pecuniary damages as a 
result of the defendant's criminal activities. 
(ii) "Victim" does not include any 
coparticipant in the defendant's criminal 
activities. 
(4) (a) (i) When a person is convicted of criminal 
activity that has resulted in pecuniary 
damages, in addition to any other sentence it 
may impose, the court shall order that the 
defendant make restitution to victims of crime 
as provided in this subsection, or for conduct 
for which the defendant has agreed to make 
restitution as part of a plea agreement. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (Supp. 1996) (emphasis added). 
For purposes of determining appropriate restitution here, 
the question thus becomes what special damages could the purported 
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car security interest holder "recover against the defendant in a 
civil action arising out of the facts or events constituting the 
defendant's criminal activities." Mr. McBride would not be liable 
for any loss of the car that resulted from the intervening and 
superseding negligence of the police in failing to contact the 
car's owners. 
A. THE POLICE ARE LIABLE FOR THE LOSS OF THE 
CAR. 
In this case, the loss of the car is wholly unrelated to 
the defendant's criminal activities. After Mr. McBride's joyride, 
the car was recovered by the police without damage. The loss of 
the car is solely attributable to the negligence of the police. 
Under familiar tort liability principles, a person is 
liable for all damages proximately caused by his or her negligence 
in breaching a duty of care. E.g. Williams v. Melby, 699 P. 2d 723, 
726 (Utah 1985). The vehicle in this case was properly impounded 
by the police. Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1101 (1) (a) , -(f) (Supp. 
1996) (vehicles operated without proper registration and stolen 
vehicles may be impounded). Under section 41-la-1103, sale is 
authorized where the owner fails to recover the vehicle within 3 0 
days of seizure, or "if the division is unable to determine the 
owner or lienholder through reasonable efforts." This section 
created a statutory duty of reasonable care in ascertaining the 
owners of the vehicle, which the police breached by miscopying the 
Vehicle Identification Number ("VIN") and thus failing to determine 
or notify the true owners. 
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There is no question but that the police would be liable 
for this breach in a civil action. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 
(Supp. 1996) waives governmental immunity "for injury proximately 
caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed 
within the scope of employment" except for specified exceptions not 
applicable here. 
In Morrison v. Salt Lake City Corp., 600 P.2d 553 (Utah 
1979), the Supreme Court reversed a grant of summary judgment for 
the State Tax Commission arising from the sale of plaintiff's 
motorcycle without proper notice to plaintiff. The court held that 
governmental immunity was waived under § 63-30-10, and that the 
factual issue as to the Tax Commission's negligence was an issue 
for the jury. 
Here, there is little question that the failure to 
correctly copy the VIN was negligent, and proximately caused the 
non-notification of the owners and subsequent loss of the vehicle 
at impound sale. The police are liable for the loss of the 
vehicle. 
B. SINCE THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE POLICE WAS 
NOT FORESEEABLE, MR. McBRIDE IS NOT 
LIABLE FOR THEIR NEGLIGENCE. 
Under the law of superseding causation, Mr. McBride is 
not liable for the intervening negligence of the police because the 
police negligence in misidentifying the VIN was not a foreseeable 
incident of Mr. McBride's criminal conduct. Williams v. Melby, 699 
P. 2d 723, 729 (Utah 1985) ("'A person's negligence is not 
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superseded by the negligence of another if the subsequent 
negligence of another is foreseeable.'", quoting Harris v. Utah 
Transit Authority. 671 P.2d 217, 219 (Utah 1983)); State v. Dunn, 
850 P.2d 1201, 1216 (Utah 1993) ("if the intervening party's acts 
were reasonably foreseeable as a result of the defendant's acts, 
the defendant cannot escape liability")/ State v. Hallett. 619 P. 2d 
335, 339 (Utah 1980) ("It is also held that where a party by his 
wrongful conduct creates a condition of peril, his action can 
properly be found to be the proximate cause of a resulting injury, 
even though later events which combined to cause the injury may 
also be classified as negligent, so long as the later act is 
something which can reasonably be expected to follow in the natural 
sequence of events."). 
Given the statutory duty of the police to notify owners 
prior to impound sale, Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1103 (1) ,1 and the 
ease with which vehicle identification numbers can be matched to 
owners through Department of Motor Vehicle records,2 it was 
unforeseeable that an error of this nature would occur. The 
intervening negligence of the police, unforeseeable to Mr. McBride, 
makes Mr. McBride not liable for the loss of the car. 
State v. Robinson, 860 P.2d 979 (Utah App. 1993) is also 
instructive: 
xSee also Morrison v. Salt Lake City Corp., 600 P.2d 553 (Utah 
1979) (discussing civil liability for failing to notify owner prior 
to sale). 
2It should be noted that the police routinely conduct radio 
checks of VIN's to determine if a stopped vehicle is stolen. These 
checks are neither time-consuming nor difficult. 
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Matters of negligence, proximate cause and the amount of 
resulting damages are best left to civil litigation. 
Restitution should be ordered only in cases where 
liability is clear as a matter of law and where 
commission of the crime clearly establishes causality of 
the injury or damages. 
Id. at 983. Here, liability is not clear as a matter of law and 
commission of the crime does not clearly establish causality of the 
injury or damages. Under Robinson, the restitution order here 
should not have been entered. 
While in this case it seems clear that the police alone 
are liable, and Mr. McBride is not liable, at minimum due process 
requires that Mr. McBride be accorded an appropriate hearing where 
the issues of police negligence, foreseeability, and proximate 
causation are fully explored. Robinson, 860 P. 2d at 982-983. Such 
matters are best left to civil litigation. The restitution order 
here should not have been entered. 
C. POLICY ARGUMENTS FAVOR NOT HOLDING 
CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE 
SUBSEQUENT NEGLIGENCE OF THE POLICE. 
A rule that criminal defendants should be held strictly 
liable for the superseding negligence of the police would invite 
much mischief. The police would have no incentive to conduct 
themselves appropriately. By deliberately or negligently damaging 
property during or subsequent to the apprehension of criminals, the 
police could increase the restitution those apprehended persons 
would be liable to pay. Given the prevalent indigence of 
perpetrators of crime, the ultimate loser would be the public. 
Holding the police responsible for their negligence creates proper 
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incentives for the police to protect and preserve property, as they 
should. The statutory provisions governing impound sales required 
no less here. 
POINT II. THE INTRODUCTION OF AND RELIANCE ON 
UNRELIABLE EVIDENCE AT THE RESTITUTION HEARING 
VIOLATED MR. McBRIDE'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS. 
As a matter of due process, information relied upon by 
the court at sentencing must be reliable. 
The due process clause in both the United States and Utah 
Constitutions "requires that a sentencing judge act on 
reasonably reliable and relevant information in 
exercising discretion in fixing a sentence." Howell, 707 
P.2d at 118; see, e.g. , Bavlin, 696 F.2d at 1040; 
Weston, 448 F.2d at 634; see also State v. Casarez, 656 
P.2d 1005, 1007 (Utah 1982); State v. Lipskv, 608 P.2d 
1241, 1248 (Utah 1980) (plurality opinion); State v. 
Brown, 607 P.2d 261 (Utah 1980) (opinion of Wilkins, J., 
joined in part by Maughan, J., and Stewart, J., 
concurring in the judgment). The need for evidentiary 
reliability in sentencing proceedings is greater when 
specific factual issues must be resolved. 
State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064, 1071 (Utah 1993). 
In addition to the inherent unreliability of admitting 
the billiof sale for the vehicle without any foundation from either 
of the parties to the purported agreement, the State elicited no 
substantial evidence concerning whether Mr. Martinez had been paid 
part or all of the remaining $600 on the deal. Ms. Hunter, 
girlfriend of Mr. Martinez, testified that to her knowledge, the 
$600 had not been paid. R. 60. However, she frankly admitted that 
if someone paid her boyfriend cash, and he didn't mention it to 
her, she would have no way of knowing. R. 63. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-707 (1993) (repealed May 1, 1995) 
further complicates matters. That section provided, "Until the 
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division has issued a new certificate of registration and 
certificate of title, delivery .of any vehicle required to be 
registered is not made and title has not passed, and the intended 
transfer is incomplete and not valid or effective for any purpose 
. . ." To the extent Mr. Martinez purports to be due restitution 
as a result of his ownership of the vehicle, he is statutorily 
precluded from asserting any ownership interest due to his failure 
to register the vehicle and obtain a new title. See R. 51 ("Urn, 
actually he had boughten (sic) it, and without a driver's license 
we decided just to get rid of it so he wouldn't drive it and so on. 
It was never registered in his name or anything, so . . . ") , 64 
(never registered or titled in Mr. Martinez' name). 
The Title itself, State's Exhibit 2 (R. 20-21, attached 
as addendum C) , has facial infirmities. The purported transfer 
from Craig Allen to Mr. Martinez fails to have a notarization of 
Mr. Allen's signature. Furthermore, the odometer disclosure 
statement is not filled out, as required by federal and state law. 
On its face, the vehicle title raises substantial questions as to 
whether a valid transfer took place. 
The State presented no evidence concerning the proceeds 
of the impound sale. Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1104 (1993) provides 
that any excess proceeds shall be refunded to the owner if a proper 
claim is made within one year of the sale. Mr. McBride would be 
entitled to an offset for any such funds properly recoverable by 
Mr. Martinez. 
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Under all the circumstances, the due process rights of 
Mr. McBride were violated by the trial court's reliance on 
unreliable hearsay, and the failure to accord a full and complete 
hearing on the issues of the negligence of the police, proximate 
causation, and appropriate offsets from the proceeds of the sale. 
POINT III. THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN 
THE RESTITUTION ORDER IMPOSED. 
Fully marshalled, the evidence supporting the restitution 
order imposed consists of the following: 
The purported bill of sale, State's Exhibit 1 
(R. 18-19, attached as addendum B) in which Wade Maneotis 
purported to purchase the car from Toby Martinez. 
The vehicle title, State's Exhibit 2, 
documenting an unnotarized transfer from Craig L. Allen 
to Toby Martinez. The odometer disclosure was also not 
filled out. 
The testimony of Ms. Ellen Hunter (R. 49-65), girlfriend 
of Toby Martinez, was that: 
a) The car was sold from Toby Martinez to Wade 
Maneotis for $800, $200 down and $600 to be paid a week 
later, with Toby Martinez keeping the vehicle title to 
secure payment (R. 51-54). 
b) To her knowledge, Wade Maneotis never paid the 
additional $600 (R. 60) , and that in her discussion with 
Mr. Martinez he stated that he had not been paid the $600 
(R. 65). 
This evidence, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn 
therefrom, is insufficient to sustain the restitution order 
imposed. 
There was no evidence adduced indicating that the failure 
of the police to notify the owner was attributable to Mr. McBride's 
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conduct. As a matter of common sense, Mr. McBride cannot be said 
to have forced the police to copy the VIN incorrectly, and thus 
fail to notify the owner. 
There was no evidence adduced concerning the proportional 
fault between the police, Mr. Martinez, and Mr. McBride for the 
loss of the car. When apprehended, Mr. McBride had possession of 
the car in undamaged condition. The police took it from him. 
After it was impounded, Mr. McBride was unable to control its 
further disposition, and should be held faultless. 
Mr. Martinez failed to have the car registered or titled 
in his name. Even if the police had not miscopied the VIN, notice 
would have gone to Craig L. Allen. Mr. Allen would be under no 
duty to locate or inform Mr. Martinez. No evidence was adduced 
concerning whether Mr. Allen would have attempted to contact Mr. 
Martinez, or whether he would have been able to locate Mr. Martinez 
through the phone book or otherwise.3 Absent the police error in 
miscopying the VIN, any failure of Mr. Martinez to be notified 
would be attributable solely to his own negligence in failing to 
register or title the vehicle in his name. 
The State has failed to prove that Mr. Martinez could 
recover $600 from Mr. McBride in a civil action which fully 
addressed the issues of negligence, proximate causation, and 
comparative fault. It appears that Mr. Martinez' total damages 
were $600. Under Utah's comparative negligence statute, Utah Code 
3As an aside, counsel's USWest Direct white pages (September 
1996/1997) contain no listing for a Toby Martinez. 
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Ann. § 78-27-38 (supp. 1996) et seq. , Mr. McBride can only be 
liable for the entire $600 if he is 100% at fault. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-27-40 (Supp. 1996) limits Mr. McBride's liability to his 
proportion of fault. The evidence here fails to support the 
conclusion that the police and Mr. Martinez have zero fault in the 
loss of the car. Additionally, there has been no accounting made 
of the proceeds
 0f the sale, and Mr. McBride is entitled to an 
offset for any Proceeds in excess of impound costs. 
Fully marshalled, the evidence fails to support the 
restitution awar^
 0f $600 against Mr. McBride. 
CONCLUSION 
For the forgoing reasons, Mr. McBride respectfully 
requests that the restitution order be vacated. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this //•&. day of November, 1996. 
Kitd-—. 
ROBERT K. HEINEMAN 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
LISA J. REMAL 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, Robert K. Heineman, hereby certify that I have caused 
eight copies of the foregoing to be delivered to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, 400 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84102, and four copies to the Attorney General's Office, Heber 
M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South 6th Floor, P.O. Box 140854, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this j%tL day of November, 1996. 
^jj- . 
Robert K. Heineman 
DELIVERED/MAILED this day of November, 1996. 
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ADDENDUM A 
Trial Court Findings (R. 22-25) 
E. NEAL GUNNARSON 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
PAUL B. PARKER, Bar No. 5332 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)363-7900 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
DAVID SHANE MCBRIDE, 
Defendant. 
On 2/1/96, this matter came before this Court fop^a hearing on State's motion for 
restitution. The State was represented by Paul B^/Parker, Deputy District Attorney. The 
defendant was present and represented by Lisa^emal, Salt Lake Legal Defender's Association. 
The State presented the testimony of Ellen Hunter. Some evidence was offered by stipulation of 
both parties. Defendant did not present evidence. At the conclusion of the evidence both sides 
argued the matter fully. 
After having received the evidence and after having heard the arguments, this Court 
makes the following findings of fact, conclusions of law and order ; 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Prior to January, 1995, Toby Martinez purchased a 1978 Chevy Camero. Mr. 
Martinez did not register the car nor change the title to his name. 
FILED 
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2. On January 29, 1995, Martinez sold the car to Wade Maneotis for $800.00. 
Maneotis paid $200.00 down and signed an agreement which provided that he would pay the 
remaining $600.00 by February 6, 1995. The agreement also provided that the title to the car 
would remain with Martinez until the balance had been paid. After the final payment, Martinez 
would sign over the title to Maneotis. Maneotis was allowed to take the car itself. 
3. Maneotis left the car at a auto repair shop and the car was stolen from the shop. 
However, the car was not reported stolen for several weeks 
4. In the meantime, defendant was found driving the car. The car was impounded 
because of registration violations by officers from the Salt Lake City Police Department and 
taken to an impound yard. 
5. The officers misread the vehicle identification number on the car so they did not 
immediately contact either the original owners, Toby Martinez, or Wade Maneotis. 
6. Eventually, police detectives followed up on the case and found that defendant 
had been found with the car and that the car had been impounded. However, by that time, since 
the car had not been claimed, the impound lot had sold the car. 
7. Wade Maneotis did not pay Toby Martinez the remaining $600. Since the car had 
been sold, Martinez was not able to recover the car or his $600.00.. 
8. Defendant was charged with Possession of a Stolen Motor Vehicle. On 10/19/95, 
defendant pleaded guilty to Theft, a class A misdemeanor before Judge Robert K. Hilder. On 
11/21/95, Judge Hilder sentenced defendant. The sentence included restitution. Defendant filed 
a motion requesting a restitution hearing. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND 
ORDER 
Case No. 951014697 
Page No. 3 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The agreement between Toby Martinez and Wade Maneotis was a contract for 
Maneotis to purchase the car. However, under the agreement, title to the car would not pass to 
Maneotis until the remaining $600.00 had been paid. Therefore, Toby Martinez had an interest 
in the car that was stolen when the car itself was stolen. 
2. Toby Martinez could have brought an action to recover his loss from Wade 
Maneotis and others. The fact that he did not collect from those others does not limit his ability 
to collect from defendant. 
3. The actions of the police in misreading the identification number of the car and 
the resulting sale of the car did not eliminate or limit defendant's responsibility to pay restitution 
for the loss caused by his actions. 
ORDER 
Having made the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, IT IS THEREFORE 
ORDERED that defendant pay $600.00 restitution'wfticR will be paid to Toby Martinez. 
DATED this 11th day of March, 1996. * 
7 <0 • > & * 
Approved as to form: 
-/moa'O. fax* i 
LISA RSMAL 
ANNE M./STIRBA 
J U D G E ^ ; - ^ ^ ^ 
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ORDER 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the day of March, 1996 a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Findings Of Fact, Conclusions Of Law, And Order was delivered to: 
LISA REMAL 
Attorney for Defendant 
424 East 500 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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ADDENDUM C 
Vehicle Title (Ex. 2, R. 20-1) 
State Tax Commission 
Motor Vehicle Division 
1095 Motor Ave 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
VEHICLE IDENTIFICATION 
TITLE MQI VALID WITHOUT SECURITY FILM STRIP OVER THIS AREA 
¥IH-1Q87L8L534805 "v." T ~>" -
IEAB-78 HAKE-CHEV . HODES-CAB 
CYL- 8 PUEL-G .V 
BODY TtPE-CP 
*"* ALLEN CRAIG L 
ADDRESS 7 9 4 2 LIHTCN CR 
CITY-STATE-ZIP« J O R D A N 








THE MOTOR VEHICLE DIVISION, pursuant to the laws of the State of Utah, certifies that the person 
named above has been duly registered in this office as owner of the vehicle described, and that this 
vehicle is subject to the lien and encumbrance, if any, herein set forth. 
FORM TC 127 REV 7/89 
CONTROL NO T ozoRcno 
UEN RELEASE 
SIGNATURE OF UEN - HOLDER RELEASING INTEREST 
43U3 
assmm&Bm 
(N*» Owner) nam* and addmn 
Cocnptoto ttw odometer 
• NOTARY PUBLIC. OO 
Instructions l b rAii i lmw. 
feu most sign ths NEW OWNER section •ekmmtedglno©, 
DO NOT SK3N IF ODOMETER READING SECTION tS NOT COMPLETE7>^r« 
for a new title upon ths completion of purchase. The Hen, if any, shown he 
be released before you make application. 7 : 
REGISTERED OWNER T 
jfTRANSFER AND ODOMETER DISCLOSURE j ' i 3 
herein, I (we) the undersigned owners) hereby transfervfV 
|nd interest to the vehicle described on the face hereof t o ' c 
Jlwarrant the title to be free and clear of all encumbrances,^: 
identified below as New Uen - Holder, if any. -:: : -^r: 
^SALES/PURCHASE PRlCPt 
"Total P r i c e 
N e t P r i c e 
P a i d / R e c e i v e d except a lien t 
^ n s f e r o r / ^ o r r s ^ ^ N a r n l a t (Name must be printed) 
whose current address is: Street. \i7S^ S< Ok^ry f?A 





miies (no tenths) ~»T , . St C c T ^ Tip _ 
hereby certify that on the date of | this statement the odometer reads the mileage here recorded, andlhat to the best of my knowted 
and belief this reflects the actual mileage for this vehicle, unless one of the following is checked: - -(A ) Reflects the amount of mileage tn excess of the odometer mechanical limits. 
< ) £}10T the actoallrritea»for tbis vehida WARNING - ODOMETER DISCREPANCY. 
^ SjggjUtUQ of Purchaser (New tinner)
 m 
Signature of Uenhoider Releasing Interest 
Br Pale rnss" REASSIGNMENT OF TlTlf BY TRAMSFEROR X ;OWNER(SjrTRANSFER AND ODOMETER DISCLOSURE 
For the Sates/Purchase price specified herein, I (we) the undersigned owners) hereby transfer, 
convey and assign all rights, title, and interest to the vehicie described on the face hereof to 
the New Owner' named below; andi warrant the title to be free and dear of all encumbrances, 
except a Uen in favor of the personk^entifiedbelow as New Uen-Holder, if any. 
"AND STATE L/W R J 
:A 
SALES/PURCHASE PRICE 
T o t a l P r i c e [ $ _ 
T r ^ e ^ l r f t j 3 S l e > $ , 
N e t P r i c e ' 
P a i d / R e c e i v e d 
A?^^^^%^mm%%^&®. $*** 
Traneteror / Company Name 
T tName must be printed) 
whose current address is: Street. 
City. 
By Owner/Authorized Agent" (Name must be printed) 
- ODOMETER READING" 
-S t . -Zip. miies (no tenths) 
hereby certify that on the date of* this statement, the odometer reads the miieage here recordeMfflid that to the best of my knowledfle 
and belief this reflects the actual miieage for this vehicle, unless one of the following is checked: -'" ^ d< %>- ' 
•"- *
 k
 Reflects the amount of mileage' in excess of the odometer mechanical limits. ^"M- ^ - - - J 
Js NOT the actual mileage for tfiis vehicte. WARNING - ODOMETER DlSCREFy\NCY. ^ p f g p ^ ^ . •" : 
Signature of Transferor in ink (must be notarized) ' * z ^ f i l ^ 
anaoe 
Signature of Joint Transferor (must beinotarized) 
Subscribed and sworn to this ; day of. . , 1 9 . Notary "
::#5iW#i 





Signature of Notary Public or M.V. Examiner ^ j ^ r F l ^ r; _ 
. NEW LIEN-HOLDER (Name mustDeprinted) 
. NAME -•^'•^fz.-^-K^-. -• 
1ST- -ZIP. 
Signature of Purchaser (New Owner) 
ADDRESS-
CITY ^ S T _ .ZIP-
UTAH CODE ANN. §41 - 1 - 6 2 REQUIRES THE OWNER TO REMOVE THE UCENSE PLATES UPON THE SALE OR DISPOSAL OF A VEHICLE I 
ADDENDUM D 
Ms. Hunter's testimony (R. 49-65) 
1 BE HEARSAY GIVEN THAT SITUATION. 
2 FURTHERMORE, I WOULD SUBMIT THAT EVEN IF THAT'S 
3 NOT A PROBLEM, THAT MR. MCBRIDE, THE DEFENDANT, WOULD NOT BE 
4 RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY RESTITUTION OWING TO MR. MARTINEZ BECAUSE 
5 THAT'S A CONTRACTUAL MATTER BETWEEN MR. MARTINEZ, WHO SOLD THE 
6 CAR, AND MR. MANEOTIS, WHO BOUGHT THE CAR FROM HIM, IN THE 
7 SAME WAY THAT IF I BORROWED MONEY FROM THE BANK TO PURCHASE A 
8 CAR AND THEN I CRASHED THE CAR AND DIDN'T HAVE INSURANCE, I 
9 WOULD STILL OWE THE MONEY TO THE BANK BECAUSE I BORROWED THE 
10 MONEY FROM THEM AND MY CONTRACT IS TO PAY THEM FOR THE CAR. 
11 AND -- AND I WOULD SUBMIT THAT THAT'S THE SAME 
12 SITUATION. IT'S NOT MR. MCBRIDE'S FAULT THAT THERE'S THE 
13 DISPUTE BETWEEN MR. MANEOTIS AND MR. MARTINEZ. THAT'S A PRIOR 
14 CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP THAT I WOULD SUBMIT MR. -- MR. 
15 MANEOTIS IS RESPONSIBLE TO MR. MARTINEZ. HE'S THE PERSON THAT 
16 PURCHASED THE CAR AND TOOK POSSESSION OF THE CAR FROM HIM. 
17 THE COURT: I SEE. 
18 ALL RIGHT. 
19 I MR. PARKER: STATE CALLS ELLEN HUNTER. 
20 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: PLEASE STEP FORWARD TO 
21 BE SWORN IN. 
22 ELLEN HUNTER. 
23 CALLED AS A WITNESS BY AND ON BEHALF OF THE STATE, BEING FIRST 
24 DULY SWORN, WAS EXAMINED AND TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS: 
25 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: PLEASE STEP FORWARD. 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
TEN EXCHANGE PLACE, SUITE 322 



















































STATE YOUR NAME, IF YOU WILL. 
ELLEN HUNTER. 
AND WHAT CITY DO YOU LIVE IN, ELLEN? 
SALT LAKE CITY. 
AND WHO DO YOU LIVE THERE WITH? 
TOBY MARTINEZ. 
NOW, WHAT IS YOUR RELATIONSHIP WITH TOBY 
UM, WELL, WE LIVE TOGETHER THERE. 
AND HOW LONG HAVE YOU LIVED WITH TOBY MARTINEZ? 
ABOUT 14 MONTHS. 
ARE YOU MARRIED? 
NO. 
DO YOU SHARE EXPENSES AT ALL? 
YES. 
WHAT TYPE OF EXPENSES DO YOU SHARE WITH HIM? 
RENT, UTILITIES, ALL -- ALMOST EVERYTHING. 
NOW, HAVE YOU SPOKEN -- LET ME OUTLINE THIS. ARE 
> WITH THE CAR THAT WAS SOLD TO WADE MANEOTIS AND 
WAS STOLEN LATER ON? 
A 
STOLEN AND. 
YES. I WAS THERE WHEN THE CAR WAS SOLD AND 
• • J 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
TEN EXCHANGE PLACE, SUITE 322 





































LET ME BACK YOU UP. 
OKAY. 
WAS THAT PART OF -- THE VEHICLE THAT EITHER YOU 
OWNED WHILE YOU LIVED TOGETHER? (SIC) 
OUT A DRIVER 
YES. 
AND WHO SPECIFICALLY OWNED IT OUT OF YOU TWO? 
UM, TOBY OWNED IT. 
AND DID BOTH OF YOU USE IT? 
UM, ACTUALLY HE HAD BOUGHTEN (SIC) IT, AND WITH-
'S LICENSE WE DECIDED JUST TO GET RID OF IT SO HE 
WOULDN'T DRIVE IT AND SO ON. IT WAS NEVER REGISTERED IN HIS 
NAME OR ANYTHING, SO. . . 
Q WERE YOU THERE WHEN — 
A IT BASICALLY -- WE DIDN'T EVEN HAVE IT VERY LONG 
SO. . . 
Q WERE YOU THERE WHEN THE CAR WAS PURCHASED? 
A YES. 
Q AND WERE YOU ALSO THERE WHEN IT WAS SOLD? 
A YES. 
Q AND WHO ELSE WAS PRESENT WHEN THE SALE WAS MADE 
BESIDES YOURSELF? 
A UM, TOBY WAS THERE, AND WADE, AND, UM, I BELIEVE 
IT WAS WADE'S WIFE -- OR EX-WIFE -- THAT WAS WITH HIM WHEN HE 
CAME AND GOT THE CAR. 
Q NOW, DID YOU HEAR WHAT WAS SAID CONCERNING THE 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
TEN EXCHANGE PLACE, SUITE 322 




































AND -- AND THAT IS WHO WAS SUPPOSED TO PAY WHAT 
WHAT? 
YES. I WAS THERE WHEN THEY SIGNED THE BILL OF 
NOW, WHAT WAS THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN TOBY AND WADE 
OF THE CAR? 
MS. REMAL: OBJECTION; HEARSAY. 
THE COURT: OVERRULED. 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: UM, WELL, NOT WHAT WAS 
SAID, BUT WHAT YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF THIS WAS. 
HE HAD GIVEN 
KEEP THE 
THE WITNESS: OKAY. LIKE -- I UNDERSTOOD THAT 
$200 DOWN. HE COULD TAKE THE CAR AND TOBY WOULD 
PAPERWORK AND THAT, AND HE WAS TO -- I BELIEVE IT WAS 












-- TO PAY THE REST OF THE $600. 
(BY MR. PARKER) NOW, THE "HE" THAT YOU'RE 
IS WHO? 
OH, WADE MANEOTIS. 
AND HE WAS TO GET THE CAR? 
UH-HUM. (AFFIRMATIVE.) 
YOU NEED TO ANSWER OUT LOUD. 
YES. 
AND HE WAS TO PAY HOW MUCH ALL TOGETHER FOR THE 
800. 
AND DID YOU SEE HIM ACTUALLY PAY ANY OF THAT 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
TEN EXCHANGE PLACE, SUITE 322 





































I DID. UM, I WAS -- WITNESSED $200. 
AND HE WAS TO PAY THE REMAINING $600 WHEN? 
A WEEK LATER. 
OKAY. 
I BELIEVE IT WAS LAST JANUARY. 
AND WHO WAS TO KEEP THE CAR TITLE? 
TOBY. 
AND DID YOU WITNESS A BILL OF SALE BEING WRITTEN 
AND SIGNED BY TOBY AND WADE? 
A 
EXHIBIT 
YES, I DID. 
MR. PARKER: CAN I HAVE THIS MARKED AS STATE'S 
NO. 1? 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: (INAUDIBLE.) 
MR. PARKER: AND THIS IS STATE'S EXHIBIT NO. 2. 
(STATE'S EXHIBITS 1 AND 2 MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.) 
DEFENSE 
MR. PARKER: IF I CAN SHOW THESE BOTH TO 








(BY MR. PARKER) LET ME HAND YOU WHAT IS 
- BEEN MARKED AS STATE'S EXHIBIT NO. 1. IF YOU WOULD 
THAT. . . 
UH-HUM. (AFFIRMATIVE.) 
WHAT IS THAT? 
THAT'S THE BILL OF SALE THAT WADE GAVE TOBY. 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
TEN EXCHANGE PLACE, SUITE 322 




























Q AND DID YOU SEE THAT BEING WRITTEN? 
A UM, NO, I DIDN'T SEE IT BEING WRITTEN. I SAW IT 
SIGNED. 
' Q AND IS THAT BILL OF SALE IN THE CONDITION, WHEN 
1 YOU SAW IT RECEIVED AND SIGNED AT THE COMPLETION OF THAT DEAL, 
AS IT APPEARS TODAY? 
A YES. UM, PARDON ME, EXCEPT FOR THE -- DOWN HERE 
THERE'S THE G & G AUTO. THAT'S WHERE THE CAR WAS AT. 
Q AND WHO WROTE --
A [INAUDIBLE.) 
Q AND WHO WROTE THAT THERE? 
A TOBY MARTINEZ WROTE THAT IN. 
Q AND IT'S IN DIFFERENT COLOR INK? 
A YEAH. AND I BELIEVE THIS IS A PHONE NUMBER FROM 
WADE MANEOTIS -- OR AN ADDRESS, AND THAT WAS WRITTEN IN LATER 
TOO. 
MR. PARKER: IF I CAN SHOW THOSE TO DEFENSE 
COUNSEL SO. . . 
THE COURT: YES. 
(INAUDIBLE DISCUSSION.) 
MR. PARKER: AND, YOUR HONOR, JUST SO WE MAKE 
OUR RECORD CLEAR ON THAT, WHAT THE WITNESS HAS POINTED TO ON 
THE DOCUMENT -- AND IT IS IN THE COLOR OF GREEN INK -- THERE 
ARE TWO EXCEPTIONS TO THAT AND ONE IS A PENCILED STATEMENT 
ABOVE THE SIGNATURE LINE THAT SAYS: G & G AUTO REPAIR, 
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1 4735 — 
2 THE WITNESS: WEST 
3 MR. PARKER: IS THAT WEST? 
4 THE WITNESS: I THINK. 
5 MR. PARKER: NORTH OR WEST. I CAN'T READ IT. 
6 AND THEN 3500 SOUTH. AND ALSO AN ADDRESS DOWN BELOW WADE 
7 MANEOTIS' SIGNATURE WHICH IS 3065 SOUTH 2855 WEST. 
8 Q (BY MR. PARKER) LET ME HAND YOU ALSO WHAT HAS 
9 BEEN MARKED AS STATE'S EXHIBIT NO. 2. 
10 A UH-HUM. (AFFIRMATIVE.) 
11 Q WHAT IS THAT? 
12 A UM, I BELIEVE IT'S THE TITLE TO THE '78 CAMARO. 
13 Q WOULD YOU --
14 MS. REMAL: YOUR HONOR, I OBJECT TO THE WITNESS 
15 SAYING SHE BELIEVED --
16 THE WITNESS: I'M SORRY. 
17 MS. REMAL: -- IF SHE KNOWS WHAT IT IS THEN SHE 
18 CAN RESPOND. IF SHE --
19 THE WITNESS: I'M SORRY. ALL RIGHT, YES. 
20 MS. REMAL: -- DOESN'T, THEN IT'S --
21 THE COURT: ASK YOUR QUESTION AGAIN. 
22 Q (BY MR. PARKER) IT -- WHAT YOU CAN DO IS -- IS 
23 PICK IT UP AND LOOK AT THE FRONT AND THE BACK OF THE DOCUMENT 
24 (INAUDIBLE). 
25 A ALL RIGHT. 
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Q AND DO YOU RECOGNIZE THAT DOCUMENT? 
A YES. 
Q AND WHAT IS IT? 
A IT'S THE TITLE FOR THE '78 CAMARO THAT WAS SOLD 
AND SO --
Q AND HOW DID THAT TITLE GET TO COURT TODAY? 
A I BROUGHT IT. 
Q AND WHERE DID YOU GET IT FROM? 
A UM, OUR HOME THAT I SHARE WITH TOBY. 
Q AND DID YOU SEE THAT TITLE AT THE TIME THE CAR 
WAS PURCHASED; THIS CAMARO? 
A UM, I DON'T BELIEVE I SAW IT THAT DAY. BUT I 
MEAN, I -- YOU KNOW, TOBY TOLD ME HE HAD IT. BUT I DON'T 
THINK I SAW IT THAT DAY, BUT. . . 
Q DID YOU SEE IT AT THE TIME THE CAR WAS SOLD TO 
WADE MANEOTIS? 
A NO. 
Q AND WHEN IS THE FIRST TIME THEN THAT YOU SAW THE 
TITLE? 
A UM, WHEN THE CAR WAS STOLEN. 
Q AND WHERE WAS THE TITLE WHEN YOU SAW IT? 
A AT OUR HOUSE, OUR APARTMENT. 
Q AND DOES THE DESCRIPTION ON THE TITLE MATCH THE 
DESCRIPTION ON THE CAR? 
A YES. 
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Q AND IS THAT THE PERSON THAT YOU PURCH -- YOU AND 
TOBY PURCHASED THE CAR FROM? 
A YES. 
MR. PARKER: YOUR HONOR, WE'D MOVE FOR THE 
ADMISSIONS OF STATE'S EXHIBITS NO. 1 AND 2. 
MS. REMAL: YOUR HONOR, I OBJECT. THEY'RE BOTH 
HEARSAY. NORMALLY -- OR NOT NORMALLY -- BUT OFTENTIMES DOCU-
MENTS SUCH AS THIS ARE EXCEPTIONS TO THE HEARSAY RULE PURSUANT 
TO BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTIONS. SO IF YOU HAVE, FOR INSTANCE, 
THE CUSTODIAN OF A RECORD TO INDICATE THAT THEY ARE THE 
CUSTODIAN AND THEY ARE THE PERSON WHO KEEPS TRACK OF THOSE AND 
THAT THEY CAN VERIFY THE -- THEM; THAT SORT OF THING, THEN 
THEY WOULD NOT BE HEARSAY. 
BUT THIS WITNESS IS NOT THE PERSON WHO OWNS THE 
VEHICLE. THIS WITNESS WASN'T EVEN PRESENT WHEN ONE OF THEM 
WAS APPARENTLY USED DURING THE DAY THAT THE CAR WAS SOLD. AND 
I WOULD SUBMIT THAT THE STATE HAS FAILED TO PROPERLY --
PROPERLY AUTHENTICATE THEM. THEY'RE HEARSAY (INAUDIBILE). 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. EXHIBIT 1 PERTAINS TO 
THE BILL OF SALE. YOU'RE NOT ARGUING THAT THAT COULD ONLY 
COME IN UNDER THE BUSINESS EXCEPTIONS -- BUSINESS RECORDS 
EXCEPTION ARE YOU? 
MS. REMAL: WELL, I --
THE COURT: JUST AS TO EXHIBIT 2? 
MS. REMAL: IT'S HEARSAY BECAUSE THIS WITNESS 
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1 IS NOT PART OF THAT TRANSACTION. 
2 THE COURT: I UNDERSTAND THAT. WITH REGARD TO 
3 THE BILL OF SALE --
4 MS. REMAL: UH-HUM. (AFFIRMATIVE.) 
5 THE COURT: -- YOUR OBJECTION IS THAT THE 
6 WITNESS WAS NOT PRESENT AT THAT TRANSACTION. 
7 MS. REMAL: MY OBJECTION IS THAT IT'S HEARSAY. 
8 THE COURT: OH, ALL RIGHT. 
9 MS. REMAL: THAT IT'S HEARSAY. 
10 THE COURT: AND THE REASON FOR THAT IS THAT THE 
11 WITNESS IS THERE -- A PROPER FOUNDATION FOR AN EXCEPTION HAS 
12 NOT BEEN LAID. 
13 MS. REMAL: YES. PERHAPS I DIDN'T EXPLAIN THAT 
14 PROPERLY. 
15 THE COURT: AND AS TO EXHIBIT 2 YOU'RE SAYING 
16 THAT IT'S HEARSAY AND THAT THE ONLY EXCEPTION WOULD BE 
17 BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION. 
18 MS. REMAL: YES. AND THAT WE -- THAT'S NOT 
19 BEEN ESTABLISHED --
20 THE COURT: THANK YOU. 
21 MS. REMAL: -- IN MY VIEW. 
22 THE COURT: AND YOUR RESPONSE? 
23 MR. PARKER: MY RESPONSE INITIALLY IS, YOUR 
24 HONOR, IS ACCORDING TO RULE OF EVIDENCE 1101(B) THE RULES OF 
25 EVIDENCE DO NOT APPLY TO THINGS -- MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS 
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INCLUDING SENTENCING. I WOULD SUBMIT TO THE COURT THAT A 
RESTITUTION HEARING TO DETERMINE THE AMOUNT AS PART OF THE 
SENTENCE IS INDEED A RESTITUTION HEARING. THEREFORE THE 
HEARSAY RULE DOES NOT APPLY. 
MS. REMAL: I'D SUBMIT, YOUR HONOR, THAT THIS 
IS A CRITICAL HEARING. WE'RE TALKING ABOUT A -- A NUMBER 
OF -- OR A FAIRLY LARGE AMOUNT OF MONEY THAT IS AT ISSUE HERE 
AND THAT THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE UNDER THE UNITED STATES OF 
UT -- UTAH CONSTITUTIONS (SIC) REQUIRE THAT ONLY RELIABLE 
EVIDENCE BE USED AND THAT GIVEN THE HEARSAY NATURE OF THESE 
DOCUMENTS AND THE LACK OF ANY FURTHER FOUNDATION THAT IT'S NOT 
RELIABLE EVIDENCE AND IT OUGHT NOT TO BE CONSIDERED BY THE 
COURT. 
THE COURT: I SEE. WITH REGARD TO THE OBJEC-
TION AND LOOKING AT RULE 1101(B) (3), THAT PROVIDES THE RULES, 
OTHER THAN WITH RESPECT TO PRIVILEGES, DO NOT APPLY IN THE 
FOLLOWING SITUATION: (3). MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS FOR 
EXTRADITION, SENTENCING, OR GRANTING OR REVOCATION OF PROBA-
TION, ISSUANCE OF WARRANTS FOR ARREST, CRIMINAL SUMMONSES, AND 
SEARCH WARRANTS AND PROCEEDINGS WITH RESPECT -- WITH RESPECT 
TO RELEASE OF BAIL OR OTHERWISE. 
IF THE RULE ALSO PROVIDES FOR SOME OTHER PROCEED-
INGS, INCLUDING GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS, PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS 
OF FACT, CONTEMPORATE PROCEEDINGS, AND SO FORTH. (SIC) 
IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THIS HEARING WOULD FALL UNDER 
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1 THE CONCEPT OF MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS FOR SENTENCING OR IN 
2 RELATION TO PROBATION BECAUSE IT HAS TO DO WITH — I DON'T 
3 KNOW WHETHER THE -- THE CONTEXT OF THIS IS THAT MR. MCBRIDE 
4 HAS ALREADY BEEN SENTENCED OR --
5 I MS. REMAL: HE HAS BEEN. 
6 I THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. WELL, THEN -- AND HAS 
7 HE -- WHAT WAS THE DISPOSITION OF THAT SENTENCE? 
8 MS. REMAL: HE WAS GIVEN ONE YEAR OF JAIL. 
9 THE COURT: UH-HUM. (AFFIRMATIVE.) 
10 MS. REMAL: AND WAS ORDERED -- WAS INDICATED 
11 THAT A -- RELEASED TO A PROGRAM THAT JUDGE LEWIS MIGHT DETER-
12 MINE TO ALLOW HIM TO GO TO BECAUSE HE'S ON PROBATION WITH HER 
13 AS WELL WOULD BE APPROVED BY JUDGE HILDER, SO. . . 
14 THE COURT: I SEE. WELL, IT SEEMS TO ME THAT 
15 THIS IS OF THE SAME CHARACTER AS THE SENTENCING PROCEEDING AND 
16 IS, IN FACT, AN ESSENTIAL PROCEEDING WITH REGARD TO THAT. AND 
17 I ACCORDINGLY, I THINK IT DOES FALL UNDER RULE 1101(B), THERE-
18 FORE, THE OBJECTIONS ARE OVERRULED AND EXHIBITS 1 AND 2 ARE 
19 RECEIVED. 
20 MR. PARKER: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
21 Q (BY MR. PARKER) NOW ELLEN, TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE, 
22 DID WADE MANEOTIS EVER PAY THAT $600? 
23 I A NO. 
24 Q AND DID YOU EVER GET THE CAR BACK? 
25 A NO. 
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1 MR. PARKER: YOUR HONOR, AT THIS TIME I WOULD 
2 LIKE TO SUBMIT -- I BELIEVE WE CAN DO IT BY STIPULATION -- A 
3 LITTLE BIT OF WHAT OCCURRED ABOUT THE CAR -- AND I'VE ALREADY 
4 ALLUDED TO IT -- AND THAT IS AFTER IT WAS STOLEN IT WAS 
5 RECOVERED BY ONE OF THE POLICE AGENCIES -- AND I CANNOT SAY 
6 WHAT THAT IS OFF THE TOP OF MY HEAD --
7 MS. REMAL: I THINK WEST VALLEY. 
8 MR. PARKER: WEST VALLEY. 
9 1 MS. REMAL: (INAUDIBLE.) 
10 MR. PARKER: A POLICE AGENCY WAS GOOD ENOUGH. 
11 THEY -- THEY IMPOUNDED. IT WAS SENT TO THE STATE 
12 TAX YARD — OR STATE TAX IMPOUND YARD. SOMEBODY MISWROTE THE 
13 SERIAL NUMBER; THEREFORE, IT WAS NOT TRACKED PROPERLY. 
14 NEITHER MR. MANEOTIS, NOR TOBY MARTINEZ, NOR MISS HUNTER WERE 
15 CONTACTED. THE CAR SAT THERE ACCUMULATING STORAGE AND -- AND 
16 TOWING BILLS AND THEN IT WAS EVENTUALLY SOLD TO SOMEONE ON 
17 AUCTION, AND THAT CAR IS NO LONGER AVAILABLE TO EITHER THE 
18 STATE OR -- OR TOBY MARTINEZ. 
19 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT, THANK YOU. 
20 MR. PARKER: WITH THAT I WOULD REST, YOUR 
21 HONOR. 
22 THE COURT: YOUR WITNESS. 
23 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
24 BY MS. REMAL: 
25 Q MISS HUNTER, HOW DO YOU AND MR. MARTINEZ KEEP 
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1 TRACK OF YOUR -- OF YOUR FINANCES? DO YOU HAVE, FOR INSTANCE, 
2 ONE BANK ACCOUNT, ONE CHECKING ACCOUNT THAT YOU BOTH 
3 CONTRIBUTE TO, OR DO YOU KEEP YOUR FINANCE MORE OR LESS 
4 SEPARATED? 
5 A UM, NEITHER ONE OF US HAVE A CHECKING ACCOUNT OR 
6 A BANKING ACCOUNT. 
7 Q IN TERMS OF, SAY, ANY HOUSEHOLD EXPENSES AND --
8 AND THAT SORT OF THING, JOINT EXPENSES --
9 A UH --
1® Q — HOW DO YOU TAKE CARE OF THOSE EXPENSES? 
11 A WE BOTH -- LIKE HALF. WE BOTH PAY THOSE. 
12 Q AND — AND ARE THERE EXPENSES THAT EITHER ONE OF 
13 YOU WILL HAVE INDIVIDUALLY THAT YOU TAKE CARE OF BY YOURSELF 
14 WITHOUT DISCUSSION WITH THE OTHER PERSON? 
15 A UM, IT'S USUALLY DISCUSSED BUT, LIKE, I HAVE 
16 BILLS THAT ARE MY OWN --
17 Q UH-HUM. (AFFIRMATIVE.) 
18 A -- AND HE DOES HAVE BILLS THAT ARE HIS OWN. 
19 Q AND WITH FINANCIAL MATTERS THAT YOU CONSIDER YOUR 
20 OWN AS OPPOSED TO --
21 A UH-HUM. (AFFIRMATIVE.) 
22 Q -- A JOINT MATTER, DO YOU NECESSARILY DISCUSS 
23 THOSE THINGS, OR SOMETIMES YOU JUST TAKE CARE OF YOUR OWN 
24 FINANCIAL -- FINANCIAL MATTERS FIGURING THEY'RE YOUR OWN 
25 BUSINESS AND YOU DON'T NEED TO DISCUSS IT? 
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1 A UM, NO, WE STILL DISCUSS IT. 
2 Q YOU INDICATED THAT AS FAR AS YOU KNOW MR. 
3 MANEOTIS NEVER PAID TOBY THE REMAINING $600; IS THAT--
4 A RIGHT. 
5 Q -- RIGHT? HOW WOULD YOU KNOW WHETHER OR NOT MR. 
6 MARTINEZ HAD EVER RECEIVED THAT? DOES HE SHOW YOU, FOR 
7 INSTANCE, THAT -- HIS PAYCHECK WHEN HE GETS IT OR ANY MONEY 
8 THAT COMES IN? IS THAT (INAUDIBLE). 
9 A UM, YES, HE DOES. 
10 Q AND HOW DOES THAT HAPPEN? 
11 A WELL, IT COMES IN THE MAIL. 
12 Q UH-HUM. (AFFIRMATIVE.) 
13 A AND SO -- AND I ALWAYS PICK UP THE MAIL. UM --
14 Q IF HE WERE TO RECEIVE CASH FROM SOMEONE WHO OWED 
15 HIM MONEY WOULD -- IF YOU DON'T HAVE A CHECKING ACCOUNT --
16 A UH-HUH. (AFFIRMATIVE.) 
17 Q -- AND UNLESS HE MENTIONED IT TO YOU --
18 A UH-HUM. (AFFIRMATIVE.) 
19 Q -- YOU WOULD HAVE NO WAY OF KNOWING, WOULD YOU? 
20 I A NO. 
21 UM, CAN I SAY SOMETHING ELSE THOUGH? 
22 Q I DON'T HAVE ANY FURTHER QUESTIONS IN THAT 
23 REGARD. 
24 A OKAY. 
2 5 Q NOW, YOU INDICATED THAT YOU HADN'T PREVIOUSLY 
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SEEN THE -- WELL, LET ME ASK YOU. . . 
MS. REMAL: DO YOU HAVE --
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: YES, I DO. 
Q (BY MS. REMAL) IN REGARD TO EXHIBIT NO. 2 
WHICH IS THE TITLE — 
A UH-HUM. (AFFIRMATIVE.) 
Q -- THE PERSON WHOSE NAME IS ON THE TITLE APPEARS 
TO BE CRAIG ALLEN. IS THAT RIGHT? 
A RIGHT. 
Q AND I THINK YOU INDICATED THAT WHEN TOBY 
PURCHASED THE CAR, AS YOU UNDERSTAND IT, BECAUSE HE DIDN'T 
HAVE A DRIVER'S LICENSE HE NEVER EVEN BOTHERED TO REGISTER IT. 
A RIGHT. 
Q HE NEVER BOTHERED TO GET A TITLE ISSUED IN HIS 
NAME EITHER? 
A NO. 
Q SO THIS CAR THAT YOU'RE DISCUSSING WAS NEVER 
REGISTERED TO HIM, NOR DID HE HAVE THE TITLE IN HIS NAME AT 
ANY TIME. 
A NO. 
MS. REMAL: I DON'T HAVE ANY FURTHER QUESTIONS, 
YOUR HONOR. THANK YOU. 
THE COURT: ANYTHING ELSE? 
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1 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
2 BY MR. PARKER; 
3 Q DID YOU DISCUSS WITH TOBY WHETHER OR NOT WADE HAD 
4 EVER PAID HIM THE $600? 
5 A YES. 
6 0 AND WHAT DID HE SAY? 
7 A HE TOLD ME "NO". 
8 MR. PARKER: NO FURTHER QUESTIONS, YOUR HONOR. 
9 MS. REMAL: NOTHING FURTHER. 
10 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. YOU MAY STEP DOWN, AND 
11 THAT CONCLUDES YOUR TESTIMONY. THANK YOU FOR YOUR TESTIMONY. 
12 THE WITNESS: UH-HUM. (AFFIRMATIVE.) 
13 THE COURT: YOU ARE NOW EXCUSED. 
14 AND THE STATE HAS RESTED? 
15 MR. PARKER: THE STATE HAS RESTED, YOUR HONOR. 
16 THE COURT: MS. REMAL? 
17 MS. REMAL: YOUR HONOR, I DON'T HAVE ANY 
18 EVIDENCE TO PRESENT. I DO HAVE SOME ARGUMENT TO MAKE. 
19 THE COURT: GO AHEAD. WELL, MR. PARKER FIRST. 
20 I -- I THINK I KNOW WHAT YOUR ARGUMENT IS. 
21 MR. PARKER: OKAY. I COULD JUST SUBMIT IT THEN 
22 AND RESPOND IF YOU WOULD LIKE, YOUR HONOR. 
23 MS. REMAL: YOUR HONOR, I WOULD SUBMIT THAT AS 
24 MR. PARKER HAS -- HAS OUTLINED, THIS IS A RATHER UNUSUAL CASE 
2 5 BECAUSE THERE WERE A NUMBER OF STEPS THAT HAVE OCCURRED 
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